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The purpose of my paper is to consider whether data on the forward
investment commitments of life insurance companies and other investing
institutions can be of aid in anticipating general business developments.
Therefore, the bulk of my comment will be devoted to the coverage of life
insurance commitment figures and their behavior during 1951-56. A
necessary preliminary is the definition of a forward commitment.
What Are Forward Investment Commitments?
A "forward investment commitment" is a binding agreement on the
part of a lending institution to make available a given amount of funds,
upon given credit terms, at specified dates or over an agreed-on period
of time varying from just over a month to two or three years. The agree-
ment gives the interest rate, maturity, redemption privileges, and so forth,
and sets forth a schedule of disbursement or "takedown" of the funds.
Whether it is written or oral, the lender regards it as morally binding, and
the borrower, too, is obligated. To an increasing extent in recent years,
particularly as the bargaining power of the lender has become stronger,
the agreement has involved a commitment fee to provide some assurance
that the borrower will abide by the agreement.
A large percentage of commitments are made in connection with the
direct placement of corporate securities. For example, the Prudential
Insurance Company of America may agree to purchase $50 million of
the bonds of International Business Machines at given credit terms and
on a prearranged takedown schedule. Over 90 per cent of the industrial
bonds purchased by life insurance companies today are direct placements
and involve the forward commitment process. Business and industrial
mortgage loans are also arranged this way. Thus, a mortgage loan to a
real estate developer to build an office building would involve a forward
commitment. rn residential mortgage loans, too, the lending institution
may bind itself to advance funds to a builder or a prospective owner-
occupant on prearranged terms. This commitment is in turn the basis for
construction credit by a bank. Other major types of financing involving
the forward commitment are purchase-lease deals and state and local
government financing. Many toll roads were financed by life insurance
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companies with the funds committed for two to three years in advance of
the final takedown.
Our data include some commitments to bond houses to purchase a
given amount of a public issue. Normally however, public issues of
corporate securities do not give rise to a forward commitment partly
because, to appear in our data, the commitment must have a life of over
one month.
Life insurance companies are not the only type of financial institution
making forward commitments. Commercial banks have made forward
commitments regularly for many years, and their term loans involve a
procedure practically identical with that employed by life insurance
companies in direct placements of corporate securities. Uninsured pension
funds, to the extent that they acquire direct placements of corporate
securities, also make forward commitments. Similarly, mutual savings
banks and savings and loan associations are active in the mortgage field
in arranging their financing on this basis. But to the best of my knowledge
only the life insurance business has obtained regular reports on commit-
ments for any length of time. Recently the savings and loan associations
have begun to collect these data, and I hope that other lender groups will
soon follow suit.
What Do the Commitment Data of the Ljfe Insurance Association of
America Cover?
The collection of forward commitment data by the LIAA began in
April 1951 under the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program. As participants
in the program the life insurance companies submitted monthly commit-
ment data to the Federal Reserve Board as an evidence of whether their
current lending activities were in keeping with the VCRP. The monthly
data, with suitable modifications, have been obtained regularly ever since.
Originally, the canvass included companies holding about 85 per cent of
total life insurance assets, but after the VCRP was terminated in March
1952 the ratio was reduced to about two-thirds. This coverage is very
satisfactory for blowing up the total forward commitments of the life
insurance business but less so for estimating the component parts of the
series.
Our monthly reports show two major types of forward commitments,
those involving securities and those involving real property and mortgages.
Under securities are classified business and industrial bonds, public utility
bonds, railroad bonds, state, municipal, and local securities, and all other
securities. Business and industrial commitments in turn are broken down
according to the Standard Industrial Classification. Real property and
mortgage loans include business and industrial mortgages, real property
for lease or rental, home office buildings, farm mortgages, and nonfarm
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residential mortgages. The latter are in turn broken down into Federal
Housing Administration—insured, Veterans Administration—guaranteed,
and conventional.
The tables show new commitments made during the month and the total
amount outstanding at the end of the month in each category. The reports
further indicate how large an amount within each category of outstanding
commitments is expected to be taken down within one month, two months,
and six months. Until recently the breakdown was simply within six
months and over six months. The tables also reveal takedowns during the
month, a.nd cancellations.
Behavior of Forward Commitment Data, 1951-1956
Chart 1 shows, in index number form, the changes which have taken
place in total outstanding commitments, and in outstanding commitments
to purchase securities and real property and mortgage loans from April
1951 through December 1956. To make the series consistent over time I
included only those companies which reported throughout the entire
period.
Commitments immediately before the base month, April 1951, were at a
very high level because there had been a sharp build-up in the second half
of 1950 and early in 1951 before the Federal Reserve—Treasury "accord."
Anticipation of Regulation X, instituted in October 1950, was a great
inducement to builders and mortgage bankers to obtain immediate mort-
gage commitments. The ability of investing institutions to dispose of
federal government securities at pegged prices above par also encouraged
the build-up.
By April 1951 total commitments outstanding had begun a decline which
carried the index to 80 in August 1951. It fluctuated about this level until
February 1954 when a steady rise began which carried it to 125 in Novem-
ber. After a decline to 116 in December 1954, the index displayed con-
siderable stability during 1955 but 1956 saw a steady rise from 117 in
January to 139 in October and November, with a falling back to 133 in
December.
During the same period, the two major component series showed widely
divergent movements. Commitments to purchase real property and mort-
gages of all types declined steadily from an index of 100 in April 1951 to
59 in July 1952. Commitments to purchase securities declined from the
April base to 88 in August 1951, but rose spectacularly to 142 in September
1952. This build-up gave some clue to the pronounced rise in business and
industrial expenditures which occurred in the first several months of 1953
on a seasonally adjusted basis.
The index of commitments for real property and mortgage loans, having
reached a low in July 1952, remained stationary through December. It
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CHARTI
Outstanding Commitments, Total and for Securities and Real Property and
Mortgage Loans, Monthly Index, April1951—December 1956
Source: The data were compiled by the Life Insurance Association of America.
Commitments of only those life insurance companies which reported throughout
the entire period are included.These companies represented more than 60 per cent




drifted upward to 76 in February 1954 and then rose more rapidly to 125
in May 1955. It held this position for the remainder of 1955 and then rose to
132 by May 1956, then fell back to 110 by December 1956. In connection
with these movements, it is important to note that within the general
category of real property and mortgage commitments there are important
divergent movements between commercial and industrial mortgage loans
(which behave more like securities commitments) and residential mortgage
loan commitments.
Returning to commitments to purchase securities, the index fell off in
October 1952 through January 1953, and then rose from 106 in January to
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133 in April 1953. After a decline to 118 in June, the commitments moved
within a somewhat narrower range the rest of 1953 and1954. The index
declined in December 1954 through April 1955, but August 1955 saw the
beginningof an upswing which was particularly pronounced between
March and November 1956 when the index jumped from 114 to 180. This
rise may have anticipated the boom in business and industrial plant and
equipment expenditures which got under way in
1957.
1956 and continued in
Chart 2 shows the percentage of total outstanding commitments for
securities compared with those for real property and mortgages from
September 1952 through 1956.
figures remained fairly stable fromOctober 1952 through May 1953,
whereupon the securities percentage showed a steady decline through
May 1955 and the real property and mortgage percentage a corresponding
rise. The shift from Federal Reserve credit restraint to ease beginning in
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the spring of 1953 contributed to this shift in commitments. Beginning in
June 1955thesecurities proportion of the commitments rose steadily
through 1956 and the real property and mortgage proportion declined.
Chart 3 presents index numbers showing changes from April1951 through
1956 in commitments to purchase business and industrial bonds, business
and industrial mortgages, and nonfarm residential mortgages. The index of
commitments to purchase business and industrial bonds declined from
100 in April 1951 to 84 in August, and then rose more or less steadily to
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150 in July and August 1952. Here again may be an indication of the
business plant and equipment boom which occurred in the latter part of
1952 and during 1953. Beginning in September 1952 a decline occurred
which placed the index at 108 in January 1953. After a rise to 134 in April
1953, the index dropped suddenly to 108 in June and 97 in July and
hovered around these points through January 1954. In February the index
jumped to 133, where it stabilized until it began to rise again in September.
It reached 153 in November 1954 but suddenly shifted to 124 in December
and remained at about that level through May 1955. The index then rose,
at first moderately then spectacularly, to 251 in November 1956, a rise
which may have suggested that the boom in capital spending by business
and industry would be sustained throughout 1957.
The sudden changes from one level of commitments to another, particu-
larly characteristic of this index, are probably explained by one or a few
large new commitments or takedowns in a given month. Also, it is worth
noting that it seems to be a regular pattern for commitments to decline in
December of each year, a pattern probably due to peculiarities in the
operation of life insurance company investment departments.
Turning to the index of business and industrial mortgage commitments,
the prolonged and great rise from 106 in January 1953 to 312 in August and
September 1956 reflects the tendency for life insurance companies in
recent years to concentrate more of their mortgage investments in the
business and industrial field for portfolio balance. It also reflects the boom
in industrial and business financing of the past few years. The mortgage
loan has especially been used to finance small business enterprises and
particular types of construction such as shopping centers.
The index of commitments to purchase nonfarm residential mortgages
is particularly interesting. This index declined steadily from 100 in April
1951 to 37 in July 1953. Just before July 1953, the Federal Reserve moved
to a policy of credit ease and the VA mortgage interest rate was raised
from 4 to 45 per cent. The shift to residential mortgages followed like
night the day. From July 1953 to November 1954 the index rose from
37 to 102—an indication of the resurgence of the resIdential construction
boom in 1955. Commitments stayed at close to peak levels until March
1955 and then declined to 60 in December 1956, anticipating the decline in
residential construction in 1956 and 1957.
Chart 4 shows the percentage of total outstanding commitments in the
form of business and industrial bonds, business and industrial mortgages,
and nonfarm residential mortgages from September 1952 through 1956. A
familiar picture emerges. The percentage of total outstanding commit-
ments in the form of business and industrial bonds declined slightly from
39 per cent in September 1952 to 33 per cent in January 1953. There
followed at first a moderate rise, then a decline, to below the 30 per cent
level, and then relative stability. After a jump to 33 per cent in February
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CHART4
Outstanding Commitments for Business and Industrial Bonds and Mortgages














1954, the percentage declined to 25 by year-end. There was little change
until August 1955 when the percentage began a climb which took it to
42 in November 1956.
The percentage represented by and industrial mortgages rose
more or less steadily fromSeptember 1952 through September1953,
whereupon it was stable for over a year. It rose gradually from 20 per cent
in November 1954 to 29 per cent in July 1956, and then declined to 23
per cent in December
The percentage of total outstanding commitments in the formof
nonfarm residential mortgages rose slightly in the last quarter of 1952 and
then flattened out at a lower level during most of 1953. Beginning in the
last quarter of 1953 the percentage rose from 21 to 39 in January 1955.
At that point a decline set in which persisted during the remainder of
1955 and throughout 1956.
Chart 5 shows a breakdown of the component parts of nonfarm resi-
dential mortgages: FHA—insured, VA—guaranteed, and conventional. The
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highly volatile series are commitments to purchase VA mortgages, which
declined sharply from April1951 through December, as a result of two
forces. After their big build-up in 1950 there was a natural tendency to let
them decline for portfolio balance. Also as demand for corporate funds
increased, and corporate bondyieldsrose, fundswere attractedaway
from the VA mortgage field where the gross rate was pegged at 4 per cent.
The index displayed unusual stability at a low level until September 1952
but then sagged to a low of 14 in June 1953. In late April and early May
two events of great importanceto the capital market occurred.The
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to one of ease and then later in the year "active ease", and the VA interest
rate was raised to 44percent. The Federal Reserve's action accentuated
the force of a reduced demand for corporate funds which occurred at that
time. The combination of a rise in the VA rate (belatedly and just when it
was not needed) and the decline in corporate yields produced a rise in VA
commitments beginning in July 1953. The index rose from 14 in June 1953
to 42 in February 1954, and then gathered momentum to reach a peak of
147 in November. Despite the accelerating flow of funds, the yield on VA
mortgages was not driven downward. During the second half of 1953 and
throughout 1954 discounts were readily available on 44 per cent VA
mortgages. Apparently, as the supply schedule of VA funds shifted to the
right, it induced a counterbalancing shift in the demand schedule. What
happened was that lending institutions eased other terms in VA loans. In
early 1954 the no-downpayment thirty-year VA loan became common
and by the late spring builders were offering all kinds of special induce-
ments to prospective owners. Since homes are purchased today with a
downpayment and monthly carrying charges, in which the interest rate is
not a major factor, the no-downpayment and long amortization terms
actually created a demand for housing which accommodated the expanded
flow of funds into VA mortgages at relatively attractive net yields.
Turning to Chart 5 again, one can see that at the end of 1954 the VA
commitment index started a steady decline which carried it from 147 in
November to 83 in December 1955 and to 50 in December 1956. The
decline occurred because of a shift in commitments primarily to industrial
securities, industrial and business mortgages, and conventional residential
mortgages. The shift took place because of a resurgence in business and
industrial demand for capital funds and a change in Federal Reserve policy
to one of credit restraint. Yields on business and industrial securities rose
to the point where the VA mortgage at a gross rate of 44 per cent (net of
per cent) was no longer attractive, especially on overly liberal down-
payment and amortization terms. Increasing discounts on these mort-
gages were largely ineffective in holding the flow of funds from life
insurance companies because the latter were reluctant on public relations
grounds to purchase VA mortgages at other than rather moderate dis-
counts. The flow of funds into conventional mortgages was maintained
because rates were flexible and thus competitive. Just as the sharp build-up
in VA commitments in the latter part of 1953 and in 1954 anticipated the
boom in residential construction which took place in the latter part of
1954 and in 1955, so the decline in these commitments beginning in early
1955 signaled the decline which occurred in late 1955 and throughout 1956
and l957 in houses financed with VA mortgages.
Throughout most of the period life insurance companies generally
preferred VA to FHA mortgages, probably because of more favorable
redemption terms on the former in case of default. Although the two
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indexes tended to fall and rise together, after September 1953 FHA
commitments were consistently much lower in dollar amounts than VA
commitments and also were lower than their own level in 1951 and the
first half of 1952. From April 1951 the index declined steadily to 23 in
August 1953. It rose to 36 in January and February 1955, exhibited con-
siderable stability through December, and then declined to 19 in Decem-
ber 1956.
The index of conventional mortgage commitments moved to a lower
level in early 1951 and then fluctuated generally within a narrow range
until early 1953. The index rose from 85 in January 1953 to 115 in June,
and then declined to 101 in July where it held through December. January
1954 saw the start of a build-up which, with minor setbacks, continued
until the index reached 183 in May 1956. By the end of 1956 it had fallen
back to 154.
One would expect to find the greatest stability in conventional mortgage
commitments because (1) the contract rates of interest are flexible and
remain in line with competing rates in other sectors of the capital market;
and (2) institutional investors such as life insurance companies desire to
regularize their flow of funds into residential mortgages because of the
need of their home office and field organizations to do a mortgage busi-
ness. The latter fact means that conventional residential mortgages
naturally get a large and increasing share of funds such as was apparent,
generally speaking, from 1954 through 1956. The build-up of conventional
commitments in 1954, 1955, and 1956 perhaps gives a clue to the changing
type of residential construction of 1956 and 1957, and the fairly well
maintained volume. The build-up in conventional residential commitments
came later than did the VA build-up, and so did the takedowns.
Chart 6 shows the variations which have taken place in the structure of
nonfarm residential commitments. Of particular interest is the movement
of VA commitments as a percentage of total nonfarm mortgage commit-
ments. These commitments declined from 21 per cent in September 1952
to 14 per cent in June 1953, rose to 54 per cent in September and October
1954, and then gradually declined to 32 per cent in December 1956.
Also shown is the sharp rise in conventional commitments from 43 per
cent of total residential commitments in September 1952 to 62 per cent in
June 1953. This was to be expected in view of the rise in interest rates in
the bond market in that period and the ability of conventional mortgage
rates to move upward flexibly at the expense of administered rates in the
government-insured and guaranteed mortgage field. Conventional com-
mitments declined steadily beginning in July 1953 to reach 32 per cent in
January and February 1955. This likewise was to be expected in view of
the softening in corporate bond and conventional mortgage rates which
occurred beginning in the spring of 1953 and the relative attractiveness
of VA mortgages atper cent. Again, beginning in March 1955 the
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CHART6
Outstanding Commitments for FHA-lnsured, VA-Guaranteed, and
Conventional Residential Mortgages as Percentages of Total







percentage of conventional commitments rose from 35 to 54 in December
1956 because of a rise in corporate bond yields and a concomitant increase
in conventional mortgage rates.
The percentages for FHA mortgages show the somewhat more stable
but lower level of these commitments. Starting from a high level of 37 per
cent in September 1952, FHA commitments showed little change through
January 1953 and then underwent a prolonged decline to 14 per cent in
August-November 1954.They then began to reflect the push toward
higher-yielding government-insured and guaranteed mortgages and rose
moderately from 15 per cent in December 1954 to 19 per cent in November
and December 1955. During 1956 they declined gradually.
Chart 7 shows, in index numbers, changes in total new commitments












1952 1953 1954 1955 1956and real property and mortgages, from IV 1951 through 1956. New
commitments are perhaps more useful than outstanding commitments in
connection with business anticipations because they are a better measure
of current investment policy.
As before, it is most instructive to analyze these data in terms of move-
ments in the constituent series. Chart 8 provides quarterly data on new
commitments to purchase business and industrial bonds, business and
industrial mortgages, and nonfarm residential mortgages. For business and
industrial bonds, the new commitment index declined in each quarter of
1952. Although it rose in I and 111953, it fell back again in III and IV.
In 1954 new commitments fluctuated at a higher level and in 1955 fluctu-
ated around a somewhat lower level. Perhaps most interesting is the sharp
rise in 1956, possibly anticipating the 1957 boom in plant and equipment
expenditures.
New commitments to purchase business and industrial mortgages
showed a strong tendency to rise in II 1952 through I 1953, and then
declined the rest of 1953. In 1954-56 they rose and held at very high levels
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CHART7
New Commitments. Total and for Securities and Real Property and
Mortgage Loans, Quarterly Index,
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CHART8
New Commitments for Business and Industrial Bonds and Mortgages
Index (IV 1951
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until a sharp decline occurred in the second half of 1956. New commit-
ments to make residential mortgage loans were higher in 1953 than in
1952. They rose sharply in 1954 but fell back in 1955 and 1956. Here again,
the broad categories make generalization difficult.
Chart 9 shows, in index numbers, a breakdown of the changes in new
commitments to make residential mortgage loans. New commitments to
purchase VA mortgages have undergone spectacular changes. Aftera
steady decline from 165 in 11952 to 56 in 11953 they rose in 111953 to 74
and then climbed dramatically to 948 in III 1954. Beginning in IV 1954 a
decline began which carried the index to 230 in IV 1956. Both the riseand
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Residential Mortgages, Quarterly Index,
Fourth Quarter 1951—Fourth Quarter 1956
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fall anticipated subsequent developments in residential construction. New
commitments to make conventional residential mortgage loans displayed
an upward trend over the period and in 1955 and 1956 foreshadowed the
nature of residential construction. As expected, new FHA commitments
showed a great deal of stability, although they declined considerably in
1956.
Charts 10-12 complete my review of the behavior of commitments. They
show the percentage of outstanding commitments within the various
categories expected to be taken down within six months. The figures high-
light the time lag between the date of the new commitments and their
subsequent takedown and use in economic activities such as home building
or plant and equipment construction. According to Chart 10 over 60
per cent of outstanding mortgage commitments are generally taken down
during the following half year while securities commitments tend to
remain outstanding for much longer.
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The data on expected takedowns also help explain trends in the commit-
ment figures.For example, Chart 10 shows that the percentageof all
outstanding commitments expected to be taken down within six months
declined from some 60 per cent in 1955 to 54 per cent in December 1956.
The decline was tied to the shift from mortgage commitments to com-
mitments for securities, but it also apparently reflected a tightening cash
flow position of the life insurance companies. Interpreted in conjunction
with cash flow data, it apparently foreshadowed the decline in outstanding
commitments during 1957.
Some Factors Affecting Commitment Policy
Prior to the "accord"
March 1951, life insurance
between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury in
companies and other institutional investors
were largely free to make forward commitments without regard to their
cash flow because of the availability of federal government securities which
could be readily sold at predictable prices above par supported by Federal
of governments,
at which
government securities could be sold at some future time when commit-
ments would be taken down required life insurance companies to pay
stricter attention to cash flow when making commitments. As time has
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however, this situation changed.
With the unpegging of the prices
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gone on, not only have the bulk of government securities held by life
insurance companies gradually been liquidated, but also heavy losses
have been involved, which serve as a strong deterrent to sales unless new
investments can be obtained at high enough rates to amortize the losses
over relatively short periods of time.
Much time and effort have been devoted by companies in the last few
years to obtaining detailed and reliable information about projected cash
flow. Since 11957 many of the companies which report commitment data
to the LIAA have also been reporting total cash flow for the quarter just
ended and expected cash flow for the ensuing two quarters. This informa-
tion enables us to relate outstanding investment commitments scheduled
to be taken down within six months to total cash flow expected in the same
six-month period. At the end of both the first and second quarters of 1957
this relationship was fairly steady at about 75 per cent. Thus, the cash
flow figures, in conjunction with the commitment figures, are helpful in
providing a clue to future developments in the capital markets.
Investment expectations also influence commitment policy. Generally
speaking, when interest rates are declining or are expected to decline,
companies will probably strive to build up their commitment accounts,
thereby tending to offset a decline in commitments which one might expect
from a reduced demand for capital funds. On the other hand, when in-
terest rates are rising or are expected to rise, some companies undoubtedly
avoid becoming heavily committed in order to reserve funds for even
better investment opportunities. Their reluctance tends to retard the
natural build-up of commitment positions in a period of heavy capital
demand. Thus not only cash flow but also forces based on investment
psychology lend stability to the volume of investment commitments at
any given time. Of course the commitment position of most institutional
investors probably reflects expectations in only a marginal way.
The commitment and cash flow data of the life insurance business are
available regularly to the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and government
agencies in the housing field. The commitment position of the life insurance
companies, and the trends in these commitments, have played a part in
Treasury decisions on how successfully a long-term bond issue could be
sold at any given time.
Forward Commitments as an Aid in Anticipating Business
Developments
Much more thought and careful study need to be given to the forward
commitment data, but it seems that they are of possible aid in forecasting
(1) the outlook for the capital market and interest rates, (2) developments
inresidential construction, and (3)business plant and equipment
expenditures.
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First, the degree to which life insurance companies and other investors
have built up a backlog of commitments relative to cash flow provides a
clue to probable developments in the capital market and accordingly in
interest rates. For example, if commitments are at a very high level
relative to cash flow, this situation, of itself, would seem to rule out any
sharp decline in long-term interest rates. However, these data are useful
only in conjunction with other information. Data on investment ex-
pectations, such as those provided by the McGraw—Hill and Commerce
Department—Securities and Exchange Commission surveys of capital
expenditure plans, the National Industrial Conference Board survey of
capital appropriations, and information on sources and uses of capital
funds, are essential elements in a forward looking analysis of capital
markets.
Secondly, data on forward commitments to make residential mortgage
loans seem to have special predictive value. Although many of these
commitments have been on existing homes, a large part have been to
finance new construction, particularly in the government-insured and
guaranteed category. It seems quite clear that the sharp rise in residential
mortgage commitments in the second half of 1953 and in 1954 anticipated
the rising tide of residential construction in the second half of 1954 and
the well-sustained high level in 1955. Likewise, the decline in residential
mortgage commitments in 1955 and 1956 seems to have anticipated the
drop in residential construction of the past two years. As noted earlier,
the causal force leading to the shift of commitments to and then away
from residential mortgages is the rigidity of government-insured and
guaranteed mortgage interest rates in the face of changing capital market
conditions.
One reservation about the predictive value of commitment data in this
area is that we must assume that the commitments actually lead to con-
struction. In the period under consideration the rate of attrition on
residential mortgage commitments has generally been stable at about
10 per cent. Economic conditions (of which the rate of residential con-
struction is a highly important part) have been such as to encourage
builders and individuals to go through with construction plans after
having received financing commitments. Possibly we shall encounter
conditions which will bring a sharp increase in the rate of attrition on
residential mortgage commitments.
Thirdly, forward investment commitment data are helpful in anticipating
changes in business and industrial plant and equipment expenditures. Here
data are much less conclusive than for residential construction, probably
because of the greater complexity of the industrial and business financing
market, but they suggest that forward commitment build-ups anticipated
the plant and equipment boom of late 1952 and first half of 1953, as well
as the boom of 1956 and 1957. However, the same reservation needs to be
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made about the assumption of a continued low level in the rate of attrition
on outstanding commitments.
In conclusion, commitment data can probably be useful in forecasting
general business conditions. Their value can easily be exaggerated, but the
possibilities are great enough to justify careful study of the forward
commitment process about which we still know too little. In this con-
nection there is a special aspect of the process which merits consideration.
Those who have studied the direct placement of corporate securities on a
forward commitment basis with life insurance companies, uninsured
pension funds, and other investors are firmly convinced that this pro-
cedure lends encouragement to long-run planning of investment expendi-
tures by business concerns, such as programs for pipeline expansions or
large scale housing developments. There is, of course, no assurance that
the rate of attrition on these programmed investments will not increase in
the event of a recession. But the greater tendency toward long-range
planning should contribute to the predictability and, perhaps, the stability
of general business conditions.
COMMENT
SAUL B. KLAMAN, National Association of Mutual Savings Banks
As one who has previously had the privilege and responsibility of access
to the data on investment commitments of life insurance companies, I am
delighted that James O'Leary and the Life Insurance Association of
America have decided to release the data publicly. This will enable users
with varying interests to exchange views on the meaning and value of
commitments figures in economic and financial analysis. And perhaps
interest in the data will lead to improvements in reporting and coverage
and stimulate other types of financial institutions to make similar informa-
tion available.
As the first available analysis of investment commitments of life insur-
ance companies, O'Leary's paper substantially advances our knowledge
and understanding of the commitment technique and its use in various
investment sectors. It tells us much about the behavior of the various types
of new and outstanding commitments during a period of important
changes in capital market conditions and in Federal Reserve and Treasury
policies. It does not, however, provide much analysis of the relationship
of commitments to investment flows and to capital formation, nor does
it deal with the problems inherent in the commitment process itself,
problems which bear directly on the usefulness of the figures in antici-
pating business developments. It is with such matters that my comments
are mainly concerned.
344FORWARD COMMiTMENTS OF INSURANCE COMPANIES
INVESTMENT COMMITMENTS AS A FORECASTING TOOL
Given the complex behavior of most economic variables, one cannot
establish simple standards for judging the predictive value of any particu-
lar time series. Certain kinds of data, such as construction contract
awards, are inherently endowed with predictive qualities. Other kinds
have been found empirically to lead business activity more or less regularly.
The series on new and outstanding commitments of life insurance
companies clearly belong in the former category in that they represent
agreements to undertake certain kinds of investment just as contract
awards represent future construction expenditures. In this framework, a
fundamental question is whether the commitments data can indicate
anything about the timing, volume, or direction of related investment and
business activity, or whether they are useful chiefly as general guides to
our understanding of a developing situation. The answer depends on
analysis, within each of the various investment sectors, of relationships
between new and outstanding commitments, flows of investment funds,
and underlying capital formation and expenditures.
For a few areas where the commitment process generally plays an
integral role and life insurance companies are an important source of
funds—the nonfarm mortgage sector, VA and FHA loan markets, and
the manufacturing component of the business securities sector—I have
compared, on a quarterly basis, new and outstanding commitments with
investment acquisitions of life insurance companies and with broader
variables in related financial and product markets. The findings suggest
that it is extremely hazardous to try to forecast quarterly or even annual
movements in the flow of investment funds, expenditures, or physical
volume, solely on the basis of movements in related commitments data in
preceding periods.
There is no clear relationship, for example, either in timing or per-
centage change in volume, between life insurance company commitments
to acquire VA loans, their actual acquisition of these loans, the total of
all VA loans closed, or total housing starts under VA loans. If someone
had used commitments data to predict the direction of change in various
types of VA activity, he would have been right in more quarters than he
would have been wrong, but he would seldom have been right in all types
of activity in the same quarter. Timing patterns are unclear, but a time
relationship seems to be more discernible in the comparison of outstanding
VA commitments with VA starts than in the other mortgage loan cate-
gories tested or in the business finance category.
These comparisons are only a small sample of the kind of investigation
which needs to be made on a continuing basis before firm conclusions can
be drawn about the predictive value of data on life insurance company
investment commitments. Many more relationships need to be examined,
various lead and lag patterns tested, and the usefulness of commitment
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takedown ratios appraised. In some sectors the data may be useful for
anticipating investment flows but not capital expenditures, in others for
anticipating new work to be undertaken rather than dollar volume of
investment. The determination of seasonal behavior, if any, in both new
and outstanding commitments series would advance our knowledge and
ability to use the data.
O'Leary noted one seasonal trend, an apparently "regular pattern for
outstanding commitments to decline in December of each year, a pattern
probably due to peculiarities in the operation of life insurance company
investment departments." This is interesting in view of my findings about
the operation of mortgage companies in a study recently published by the
National Bureau.1 I found a definite complementary relationship between
changes in mortgage company inventories and changes in mortgage
holdings of life insurance companies, which predominate as purchasers of
loans from mortgage companies. The greatest increase in life insurance
company mortgage holdings occurred consistently in the fourth quarter
of each year, coincident with a regular decline, absolute or in rate of
growth, in fourth-quarter holdings of mortgage companies. The implica-
tion is that life insurance companies draw down their outstanding commit-
ments at the end of each year as they acquire mortgages from originators
in accordance with commitments made earlier in the year.
UNCERTAINTIES INHERENT IN THE COMMITMENT PROCESS
One can hardly expect relationships between commitments of life insur-
ance companies and investment flows and business expenditures to be
precise, either in timing or in changes in activity. Variation in the number
of life insurance companies included in the commitments series compared
with the number in the investment acquisitions series accounts for some
of the difference in movements between the two. However, the commit-
ment process itself is subject to uncertainty and change in the lag between
outstandings and takedowns, the rate of attrition, techniques employed,
and relationship to cash flows. Consequently a given level of commit-
ments in any one period may give rise to a varying pattern of capital
investment and expenditures.
Improved data on expected takedowns and cancellations, available
since1957, may help to solve part of the problem. Comparison of
expected and actual takedowns from commitments, however, shows con-
siderable divergence, particularly in the mortgage loan categories. In the
business seôurities sector, expected and actual takedowns are in much
closer agreement, reflecting the greater certainty of the whole commit-
ments—investment process in this area. In any event we need longer
1SaulB. Kiaman, The Postwar Rise of Mortgage Companies, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Occasional Paper 60, 1959.
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experience with the new data on expected takedowns before we can fully
evaluate their usefulness.
The uncertain meaning of commitments to acquire mortgages reflects
the uncertainties of the mortgage and construction markets. For example:
1. Planned construction is sometimes deferred, or not undertaken, or
frequently not completed on schedule.
2. The completed mortgage loan may be for a different amount than
the commitment.
3. Commitments may not be taken up by borrowers either because they
have obtained funds elsewhere on more favorable terms or because of
otherwise changed plans.
Because of these and other uncertainties the life insurance companies
themselves have difficulty calculating expected cash flows into mortgages.
The uncertainty which attaches to mortgage commitments is illustrated
by the situation which developed in 1954 and 1955 when some companies
found themselves overcommitted relative to anticipated cash flows. The
resort to warehousing at commercial banks during 1955 while funds were
accumulated changed the 1955 pattern of mortgage investment substantially
from what might have been anticipated on the basis of 1954 and early 1955
commitments.
Translating commitments for corporate securities into cash flows is
apparently simpler for insurance companies because arrangements for
direct placements are generally more specific about date of payment than
mortgage commitments. Also corporations usually carry through their
scheduled plans for issuing securities. In contrast to the mortgage market,
the use of commitments in the corporate securities area is often more an
accommodation to the life insurance company than to the borrower.
The broader problem of anticipating developments in the corporate
securities market and in plant and equipment expenditures is complicated
by other factors. For one, much corporate financing, especially by public
utilities, is done through public offerings, with commitments playing a
minor role. When changes in corporate financing and expenditures reflect
chiefly that type of offering, rather than direct placement, movements in
the commitments figures may have little predictive value and even may be
misleading. Secondly, even in the area of direct placement, lack of informa-
tion on purpose of borrowing restricts the usefulness of the commitments
data in anticipating capital expenditures. For example, a changing pro-
portion of outstanding commitments may be associated with corporate
borrowing to repay bank debt rather than to finance new expenditures.
The lack of commitments data from other financial institutions is
another limiting factor. Shifts in anticipated investment flows from life
insurance companies do not necessarily reflect the shifts of other investors.
Indeed, when the entire investment community is considered, shifts in
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various areas may be offsetting. For example, when life insurance com-
panies were pulling out of the VA market after the Federal Reserve—
Treasury accord, savings banks were expanding their activities in it chiefly
because VA yields were competitive with those on Limited alternative
investments in Eastern areas where most savings banks are located.
GENERAL USEFULNESS OF COMMITMENTS DATA
While commitments data are apparently of limited usefulness in fore-
casting changes in timing, volume, and even direction of related invest-
ment and business activity, they contribute to our understanding of a
developing economic and financial situation. Most important is the direct
insight given into the liquidity position and investment policies of life
insurance companies and other financial intermediaries.
The volume of commitments outstanding for securities and mortgages
relative to cash flows tells a good deal about the liquidity of an institutional
investor and its maneuverability in capital markets. The relationship
between outstanding commitments in the various investment sectors
compared with past periods, and in the light of cash flows, may be indica-
tive of the ability and willingness of companies to shift their investment
programs in response to changing market developments. New commit-
ments are more sensitive than outstandings, however, in reflecting current
investment programs of life insurance companies, their reactions to changes
in monetary and fiscal policies, and to economic developments generally.
The timing of changes in new commitment volume, both in total and
within investment sectors, may be a useful indicator of lags in the impact
of monetary policy changes on capital markets.
Data on new and outstanding commitments are most useful when
related to each other. The implication of changes in new commitments in
the various investment sectors can be evaluated best only in relation to
levels of outstanding commitments. An unusually large build-up of
outstandings relative to past levels and to cash flows, for example, may
foretell a decline or shift in new commitments and in investment flows
almost irrespective of external market influences. We need to know more
about the basic relationships to assess the significance of changes in them.
Here internal company investment policies play a vital role and vary
widely. Some companies like to maintain a certain portfolio balance.
Others investentirely according toyield and ignore any resulting
"imbalances."
Because commitments have become such an integral part of the invest-
ment process, and because they often precede related investment flows by
a year or more, such data have become almost essential for appraising
current developments, apart from their usefulness as anticipations data.
Whether changes in commitments reflect changes in the available supply of
funds or in demands for funds by corporations, governments, and con-
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sumers can never be established by statistics alone. The various series
must be continually appraised in the light of all available knowledge
relating to each sector and to financial and commodity markets generally.
Regardless of the basic influences, however, clearly the availability of
commitments data enhances our understanding of unfolding economic
events.
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